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FACTUAL GROUNDS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a vehicular accident between Plaintiff William Morton and a 
vehicle owned by Defendant Continental Baking Company. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL 
1. The Complaint in this matter was originally filed July 15, 1991. R. 3. 
2. This matter has been set for trial four times. The first trial date was 
continued to give Plaintiff time to retain expert witnesses; the second due to the fact 
Plaintiff was scheduled for surgery. R. 59, 63. 
3. The third trial date of January 11, 1994 was continued because Plaintiff 
attempted to introduce new evidence and new legal theories of an expert witness, Dr. 
Philip Hoyt, the day before the trial was to begin. R. 107; Memorandum Decision, p. 
1, Appendix 5. 
4. In dealing with Plaintiffs attempt to introduce this new evidence, the 
District Court held, "[r]ather than exclude the evidence, the Court reset the trial in 
order to give the Defendant time for discovery." Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5. 
5. Three days after the trial was continued, Defendant served on Plaintiff 
interrogatories and a request for production of documents dated January 14, 1994 to 
obtain information about these new theories and evidence. R. 160, 142-138. 
6. Defendant, among other questions, specifically requested in its 
interrogatories that Plaintiff identify the new evidence which Plaintiff was going to 
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introduce through the expert, Dr. Hoyt. The interrogatory requested and Plaintiff 
belatedly responded as follows: 
(9) Please state whether the plaintiff anticipates that the previously 
identified expert, Dr. Philip Hoyt, will testify differently or in areas other than those 
specifically identified in his deposition previously taken in this case. If additional 
and/or different testimony is anticipated which is any way inconsistent with, 
supportive of, or addresses new areas of subject matter not fully and completely 
addressed in his deposition, state the following: 
(a) the new subject matter upon which Phil Hoyt will or may testify at trial; 
(b) the general substance of any new testimony or new areas which the 
expert will provide at trial, including opinions held by Mr. Hoyt 
concerning the issues in this action; 
(c) educational background, employment experience, or individual 
experience as an expert witness which the plaintiff believes qualifies Mr. 
Hoyt to provide such testimony; and 
(d) documents or other factual materal (i.e., photographs, videotapes, etc.) 
relied upon by the expert to render new testimony or testify in new 
areas. 
(9) Just as Don Remington is being provided these answers and asked to 
respond to the preceding question, Dr. Hoyt will also be given these answers 
and asked to answer this question. When the answer is received, it will be 
forwarded to you. 
(Emphasis added.) R. 145-146, Appendix 4. 
7. Despite the fact that Plaintiff had represented to Defendant and the 
Court that the evidence was ready to be presented at trial on January 11, 1994, for 
over two months Plaintiff failed to respond to the discovery requests and failed to 
respond to Defendant's letters of inquiry. Finally, on March 18, 1994, Defendant 
filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. R. 137; see also Memorandum Decision, 
Appendix 5, p. 2. 
2 
8. Plaintiff did not file any response to Defendant's Motion to Compel. 
See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2. 
9. A Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Compel for Decision, mailed 
to Plaintiff on March 29, 1994, was received by the Court and filed on March 31, 
1994, pursuant to the mailing certificate attached to the notice. R. 161. 
10. Plaintiffs counsel admitted that he was fully aware of the outstanding 
discovery requests and that a motion to compel had been filed. R. 239, H 8. 
11. In light of Plaintiffs complete failure to respond to the Motion to 
Compel, the Court contacted Defendant and directed counsel to prepare an Order 
giving Plaintiff ten days from the date of the Court's Order to provide answers to the 
discovery requests or face the sanction of dismissal of the case. R. 221; see 
Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2; see also Order, Appendix 1. 
12. Under the terms of the April 12, 1994 Order, Plaintiff had "10 days from 
the signing of this Order, until 5:00 p.m. on the tenth day, to deliver to Defendant full 
and complete responses" to the discovery requests. R. 164; Appendix 5. 
13. The certificate of mailing attached to the Order indicates that the Order 
was mailed to Plaintiff on April 12, 1994. R. 163. Brian Hale, a member of 
Defendant's counsel's staff, also provided an affidavit in which he averred that he 
personally directed that the Order be placed in the U.S. mail. R. 296. Lynn Javadi, 
Defendant's counsel's secretary, also testified by affidavit that she personally placed 
the April 12, 1994 Order in the U.S. mail. R. 308. 
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14. Defendant did not receive answers to compelled discovery by the April 
22, 1994 deadline. R. 218. See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2. 
15. On April 25, 1994, Defendant filed and served upon Plaintiff, by hand-
delivery, a Motion for Entry of Judgment to dismiss the case along with an Order of 
Dismissal. R. 226; See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2. 
16. John Braithwaite, a partner in the law firm of Hanson, Epperson & 
Smith, personally delivered the Motion to Dismiss For Failure to Comply With Order 
Compelling Discovery to Plaintiffs counsel's offices on April 25, 1994. R. 290. 
17. Plaintiff also claims that he did not receive either the hand-delivered 
Motion to Dismiss For Failure to Comply With Order Compelling Discovery which 
was hand-delivered by John Braithwaite (R. 239), or the Order granting motion to 
compel which was duly mailed to Plaintiffs counsel (see paragraph 13 above), or the 
Notice to Submit for Decision, mailed to Plaintiff on March 29, 1994. R. 162. 
18. On April 28, 1994, the District Court signed the Order of Dismissal. R. 
229. 
19. After the Court dismissed the matter, Plaintiff sent to the Court a 
certificate of delivery, certifying that he had faxed discovery answers to Defendant on 
April 25, 1994 (the day that the Motion to Dismiss the case was hand-delivered to 
him) and had mailed them to Defendant on May 6, 1994. R. 237. 
20. Plaintiffs response to the discovery requests which he represented to be 
ready to present at trial were completely non-responsive and did not comply with the 
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requirement of the April 12, 1994 Order which required Plaintiff to provide "full and 
complete responses". 
21. In fact, Plaintiffs answers, belatedly faxed to Defendant on April 25, 
indicate that the interrogatories had not even been given to Dr. Hoyt at the time 
Plaintiff responded. Plaintiff responded to interrogatory no. 9 regarding the 
testimony of Dr. Hoyt (quoted in paragraph 6 above) as follows: 
(9) Just as Don Remington is being provided these answers and asked to 
respond to the preceding question, Dr. Hoyt will also be given these answers 
and asked to answer this question. When the answer is received, it will be 
forwarded to you. 
(Emphasis added.) Answers to Interrogatories, Appendix 4. 
22. On May 11, 1994, Defendant filed a Notice of Signing of Judgment (R. 
232), and mailed a copy to Plaintiffs counsel. R. 239, 1 10. Plaintiff acknowledges 
receiving this notice which was sent in the same manner in which the previous 
pleadings had been served upon Plaintiff. R. 232. 
23. On May 11, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment and 
supporting memorandum asserting that the service of the Notice of Entry of 
Judgment received on May 9, 1994 was his first indication that an order had been 
entered, or that the case had been dismissed. R. 249. 
24. Plaintiff admitted in his Memorandum that he "intended to answer those 
discovery requests" and that he was "aware of the Motion to Compel". R. 248, 1 6, R. 
247, 1 8. 
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25. Plaintiff argued for relief from judgment because he was unaware of the 
outcome of the Motion to Compel or that an Order had been entered. R. 242-246. 
Plaintiffs counsel based his argument on his own excusable neglect in failing to act to 
respond to the motion in a timely manner. R. 242. 
26. On May 20, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition (R. 
379), and on May 26, 1994, Plaintiff replied. R. 395. 
27. The Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment on May 
26, 1994, finding no reason to grant the motion. R. 398. 
28. On June 9, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment Due to 
Fraud and to Extend Time for Appeal and memorandum in support. R. 405; 
Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5. 
29. Plaintiff argued that Defendant's attorney had affirmatively defrauded 
the Court in obtaining the dismissal and that the Court had failed to follow 
procedural rules in dismissing the case. R. 405. 
30. Despite the fact that the Plaintiff did not timely request oral argument 
of his first Motion for Relief from Judgment, on June 16, 1994, the Court vacated its 
earlier Memorandum Decision and granted Plaintiff the opportunity for oral 
argument on his several motions to set aside the judgment on July 5, 1994. R. 408. 
31. On June 14, 1994, the Court signed an Order extending the time of 
appeal to 30 days after final resolution of Plaintiffs pending motions. R. 407. 
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32. On June 17, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Due to Fraud (R. 419) and on June 20th Plaintiff 
replied. R. 436. 
33. On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal 
dated April 28, 1994 and memorandum in support. R. 447. 
34. On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition. R. 
468. 
35. On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike Order dated 
April 12, 1994 and a memorandum in support. R. 452. 
36. On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition. R. 
472. 
37. On July 5, 1994, the Court held oral argument on all of the motions 
filed by Plaintiff requesting relief from judgment. R. 477. 
38. On August 29, 1994, the District Court authored a lengthy Memorandum 
Decision rejecting each and every request for relief brought by Plaintiff. R. 484; 
Appendix 5. 
39. An Order reflecting the Court's reasoning and decision was entered on 
September 22, 1994. R. 496; Appendix 6. 
40. Notice of Appeal was filed on September 29, 1994. R. 498. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Relief from Judgment Dated May 11, 1994, based on Plaintiffs failure to show 
excusable neglect. 
Standard of Review. 
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court 
will be given broad discretion and, on appeal, its determination will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); 
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
2. Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud where Plaintiff failed to show any fraud on the 
part of Defendant's counsel. 
Standard of Review. 
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court 
will be given broad discretion and on appeal its determination will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
3. Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike Order of April 12, 1994, compelling discovery. 
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Standard of Review. 
The standard of review of a court's order granting a motion to compel is 
reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah 1989). 
4. Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike Order of April 28, 1994, dismissing the case. 
Standard of Review. 
The standard of review of a court's order dismissing a case for failure to 
comply with ordered discovery is reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989). 
5, Whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs 
claim for failure to respond to discovery, failure to file an opposition to a motion to 
compel and failure to respond to the Order compelling discovery within the time 
required by the Court Order. 
Standard of Review. 
A party's failure to comply with an order for discovery may be met with the 
sanction of dismissal by the court. Tucker Realty Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah 
1964). The standard of review of a court's order dismissing a case for failure to 
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comply with ordered discovery is reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989). 
6. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by sanctioning 
Plaintiffs counsel for making accusations of fraud on the part of Defendant's counsel 
with no basis in fact. 
Standard of Review. 
The court's imposition of sanctions for a pleading made without any basis in 
fact will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 
163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court properly denied Plaintiffs 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment. 
Plaintiff failed to show mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect justifying relief. 
Plaintiff also failed to show any fraud on the part of Defendant's counsel which would 
justify relief from the judgment. 
The Court also properly found that the express purpose of continuing the trial 
was to permit Defendant to conduct further discovery regarding new theories which 
Plaintiff represented he had ready to present at trial. 
The Court also properly rejected Plaintiffs claim that Rule 6 applied to extend 
the deadline for filing the discovery responses pursuant to the Court's Order 
compelling discovery. 
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Further, the Court properly found that Rule 4-504 did not apply to extend 
Plaintiffs time to respond to the Order compelling discovery. The Rule was rendered 
inapplicable because the Court did not allow review of the Order by Plaintiff but 
"otherwise ordered" it, thus excepting the Order in question from the application of 
the rule. 
The Court was not persuaded that the Plaintiff was unaware that the Order 
compelling discovery had been entered. The Court properly ruled that Plaintiff was 
aware that the Order compelling discovery had been entered based on the certificate 
of mailing attached to the Order and the affirmative proof provided by affidavits 
submitted in the record. 
The Court properly ruled that Plaintiff had failed to show any evidence that 
Defendant's counsel had committed fraud in procuring the dismissal. The Court's 
Order that Plaintiffs counsel personally pay Defendant's attorney's fees for such a 
serious allegation with no factual foundation should not be reversed on appeal. 
Alternatively, the judgment may be affirmed because the Plaintiffs responses 
to the discovery which were served did not comply with the Court's Order. 
Specifically, the responses received were not "full and complete responses" as 
required by the language of the Court's Order. 
The District Court, in its sound discretion, properly dismissed Plaintiffs 
Complaint for Plaintiffs failure to respond to discovery requests and Orders. 
Plaintiff not only completely failed to respond to the discovery requests of Defendant 
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which he represented to be ready to present at trial, but he also failed to respond to 
the motion to compel discovery knowing the Court would grant the motion. 
Plaintiffs conduct before and after the Judgment was entered merits the censure of 
dismissal which the Court imposed. 
The following will show that each of the arguments raised on appeal are 
subsumed in the greater question of whether the Court abused its discretion in 
ordering the discovery, dismissing the case for Plaintiffs failure to provide the 
discovery and in denying his motions for relief from judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT DATED MAY 11, 1994, BASED ON PLAINTIFFS 
FAILURE TO SHOW EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court 
will be given broad discretion and on appeal its determination will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment on May, 11, 1994. R. 249. 
He argued that his failure to serve the ordered discovery prior to the deadline was 
excused because he failed to receive notice of the Court's Order. R. 246. Plaintiff 
also repeats several of the arguments he made to the Court below which, although 
not technically before the Court, are addressed in I. A-E, below. 
12 
With respect to his claim of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, 
Plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the discovery, but that he simply was unaware 
of the Order compelling discovery which imposed the April 22, 1994 deadline. R. 
248. In response, the Court rejected the argument and his offer of excusable neglect 
stating, in the Court's opinion, based on the certificates of mailing, certificates of 
hand-delivery and his prior conduct, that Plaintiff, "knew of the order compelling the 
answers to the interrogatories and failed to answer them in the allotted time." R. 
481. 
With that finding in place, the Court was in a position to determine that 
Plaintiffs error was not caused by mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect and 
that relief under Rule 60(b) would not be proper. Rather, the Court addressed each 
of Plaintiffs several theories for relief. See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5. 
The Court held that Plaintiffs actions demonstrated a willing failure to respond to 
the discovery or the Court's Order and that none of the legal arguments were 
persuasive. While dismissal of the Plaintiffs claims for repeated failure to respond to 
discovery, motions and orders of the Court may be a harsh sanction, it was well 
within the discretion of the Trial Court and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
A. The Trial Was Continued For The Express Purpose Of Obtaining 
Further Discovery By Defendant. 
Primary to the appeal is Plaintiffs premise that discovery was not reopened. 
Plaintiff contends Defendant's service of the interrogatories and request for 
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production of documents was improper and required no response. This contention is 
an invention of desperation and is summarily rejected in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision. The Court stated: 
This case was originally filed on July 15, 1991. It has been set for trial four 
times and has involved a significant amount of legal maneuvering. The last 
continuance was requested the day before trial was to begin because the 
Plaintiff purportedly had new evidence and theories to be given by expert 
witnesses at trial. Defendant's counsel argued that it would be unfair to 
proceed without an opportunity to discover the new evidence and become 
adequately prepared. Rather than exclude the evidence, the Court reset the 
trial in order to give the Defendant time for discovery. 
Memorandum Decision, p. 1; Appendix 5 (emphasis added). 
Notably absent from Plaintiffs Brief is the Court's Memorandum Decision 
which details these procedural facts and conclusions of the Court. (Appendix 5.) 
Also absent from the record is any objection to the discovery Defendant propounded 
within the time permitted by the rules. See U.R.C.P. 33(a). Plaintiffs assertion on 
appeal that discovery was not reopened flies in the face of the fact that the entire 
trial was continued based on "new evidence and theories to be given by expert 
witnesses at trial." See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 1. 
Further, Plaintiff has previously acknowledged that he "intended to respond" to 
the discovery and, in fact, had begun to put together responses to the request. R. 
240, I 6. Plaintiffs own admissions and conduct inconsistent with his argument 
demonstrate that he was fully aware of the requests and had no objection to them as 
being untimely or improper under any scheduling order. 
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Had Plaintiff truly believed the answers to be proper, his recourse was to file a 
timely objection to the requests or, at least, object to the Motion to Compel. See 
U.R.C.P. 33. The fact that he did nothing whatsoever to object to the propriety of 
the discovery requests is fatal to his claim on appeal, especially in light of the Court's 
specific holding that discovery was reopened to prevent Plaintiffs evidence from 
being precluded at trial. 
Plaintiffs contention that the Court erred by dismissing the case because 
responding to the discovery was a gratuitous and optional gesture on his part 
illustrates the lack of substance to this appeal. With the express consent of the Court 
and lack of a new scheduling order setting a deadline, the discovery was properly 
propounded and Plaintiffs failure to respond to the discovery was the basis for the 
case being dismissed. The Court did not err below and the judgment dismissing the 
case must be affirmed. 
B. U.R.CP. Rule 6(e) Does Not Apply To Extend The Time To Respond 
To A Court Order With A Specific Deadline. 
Plaintiff also asserts that Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should 
have operated to give him an additional three days to respond to the Order 
compelling discovery and that if the three days were applied, the answers were timely 
filed. Plaintiff, however, fails to explain to this Court the actual facts which render 
Rule 6(e) inapplicable. 
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On April 12, 1994, in response to the unopposed Motion to Compel discovery, 
the Fourth District Court contacted counsel for Defendant and requested that he 
prepare an Order giving Plaintiff ten days from the date of the signing of the Order 
to answer the discovery requests or face dismissal. Defendant prepared the Order at 
the request of the Court. The Order itself did not require Plaintiff to respond Vithin 
10 days" but stated, "Plaintiff shall have 10 days from the signing of this Order, until 
5:00 p.m. on the tenth day, to deliver to Defendant full and complete responses . . .." 
See Order of April 12, 1994, Appendix 1; R. 164. 
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that three days will be 
added to the calculation, "whenever a party has the right or is required to do some 
act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice 
or other paper on him." U.R.C.P. 6(e) (emphasis added). The plain language of the 
Rule applies to deadlines with a fixed number of days to respond, such as the time 
for filing an opposition to a motion (Code of Judicial Administration, 4-501) or the 
time to file answers to interrogatories. See U.R.C.P 33(a). However, where the 
court sets a specific deadline like a discovery cutoff, or specifically requires answers 
by a certain date, the parties are not entitled to enlarge the period simply because 
the court's order was mailed to them. See Bachman v. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 85 
F.R.D. 10 (D.C. S.C. 1979). 
The plain language of the April 12, 1994 Order compelling discovery required 
Plaintiff to respond by a specific time rather than within a fixed number of days after 
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service. R. 164. As a result, Rule 6(e) is entirely inapplicable to extend the period 
for response to the Order compelling discovery. 
Plaintiffs selective memory of the events fails to present the full factual 
picture to this Court. Plaintiffs argument is merely an attempt to turn the focus 
away from his own failure to timely respond to discovery requests and the Motion to 
Compel by invoking rules of procedure which do not apply. 
G Plaintiffs Duty To Respond To Discovery Or A Motion To Compel Is 
Not Extended By Rule 4-504. 
Plaintiff further argues that somehow Rule 4-504 makes the April 12, 1994 
Order compelling discovery by April 22, 1994 ineffective because he did not have five 
days to approve or object to the Order. 
Plaintiffs proposed application of this rule makes no sense. The fact that 
Plaintiff has five days to object to a proposed order of the court does not excuse the 
obligation to obey a signed order of the court. Furthermore, an objection to the 
signed order setting a specific deadline does not extend the deadline imposed by the 
order until the matter is resolved under the rule. 
However, application of Rule 4-504 to this particular case need not be decided 
on appeal because the exception to the general rule set forth in Rule 4-504 directly 
applies to this case. Rule 4-504 generally requires an order be submitted to the other 
party, who then has five days to object before the order is submitted for the court's 
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signature. However, the rule does not apply when the court "otherwise orders". See 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504. 
In this case the Court specifically directed Defendant to prepare and submit 
the April 28, 1994 Order of Dismissal directly to the Court, thereby constituting an 
exception to Rule 4-504(2). See, Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(2). 
Plaintiff fails to distinguish or even address the exception in his brief. 
Second, Plaintiffs failure to timely file discovery responses has nothing to do 
with the requirement that Plaintiff be notified of a signed judgment or order of the 
court dismissing the case. Once again, Plaintiffs argument is merely pretext to 
excuse Plaintiffs own failure to file discovery answers in a timely manner. The Court 
did not abuse its discretion and dismissal should be affirmed. 
D. Plaintiff Received A Copy Of The April 12, 1994 Order As Reflected By 
The Certificate Of Mailing. 
While it is unclear why Plaintiff believes he has the right to object or respond 
to the April 12, 1994 Order, Plaintiff still fails to rebut the presumption that he knew 
of the deadline based on the certificate of mailing dated April 12, 1994. R. 163. The 
certificate of mailing is corroborated by the affidavits of Bryan Hale and Lynn Javadi 
of Defendant's counsel's office. R. 296, 308. 
Plaintiff further ignores the fact that he acknowledged he received the Motion 
to Compel and that he did not respond. Additionally, Plaintiff ignored the Notice to 
Submit for Decision, mailed to him on March 29, 1994. R. 162. This failure to 
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diligently pursue the case by filing a responsive pleading to the Motion to Compel 
left him the responsibility to find out what the Court had done, especially when he 
knew or should have known that the Motion to Compel had been submitted to the 
Court for decision. R. 162. See Affidavit of Plaintiff dated May 11, 1994. R. 239, 
18. Plaintiffs bald assertion that he did not receive the Order is insufficient to rebut 
the affirmative evidence that the Order was mailed to him based on the certificate of 
mailing filed with the Court and the affidavits of Brian Hale and Lynn Javadi, which 
are in the record. R. 296, 308. 
In a prior case before this Court, Mr. Snuffer attempted to argue that his 
general office procedure was sufficient to establish compliance with court 
requirements. See, Litster v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933, 940-41 
(Utah App. 1994). This Court in Litster, rejected Mr. Snuffer's claims by holding that 
conclusory evidence of "general office policy" was insufficient to establish that he had 
complied with statutory notice requirements in that case. 
Similarly here, Mr. Snuffer states only generally that he "at all times intended 
to aggressively pursue this claim, and to protect the claim of the Plaintiff." As in 
Litster, Mr. Snuffer does not forward any affirmative proof that the Order was not 
mailed by Defendant. As in Litster. he merely concludes that if his office would have 
received the various notices and orders, those pleadings would have been brought to 
his attention and responses would have been made because office procedure 
mandated it. In Litster, the Court did not allow Mr. Snuffer's office procedures to 
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overcome his obligation of providing affirmative proof of mailing notice. See Litster 
at 941. The Court here should hold that Mr. Snuffer's attempted reliance on general 
office procedures is insufficient to overcome the Defendant's affirmative proof of 
mailing of the March 29, 1994 Notice to Submit, the April 12, 1994 Order and the 
hand-delivery of Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment on April 25, 1994. R. 
290. Significantly, Defendant has met the burden required in Litster by affirmatively 
establishing that documents were served upon Plaintiff by way of the certificates of 
mailing, a certificate of hand-delivery and the subsequently filed affidavits specifically 
averring service occurred. R. 296, 308. 
Plaintiff's argument that he has diligently pursued this matter at all times and 
that he should not be punished for the failure of the post office or the system would 
have some credibility if Plaintiff had bothered to respond to the discovery requests in 
any manner. It would be entitled to some weight if he had filed an opposition to the 
Motion to Compel. However, where the Plaintiff did not even bother to respond to 
an informal inquiry from counsel regarding his failure to respond to the discovery, 
and where he completely failed to respond to a motion he knew would be granted 
since it was not responded to, his claims of clean hands and faultless conduct ring 
hollow. 
Further, Plaintiffs counsel's conduct from entry of the judgment forward in 
blaming the mails, the Court, and finally accusing Defendant's counsel of affirmative 
fraud, all illustrate Plaintiffs counsel was unwilling to admit any fault, error or 
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oversight on his part. While the sanction of dismissal may be harsh, the District 
Court is in a much better position to determine whether the circumstances require 
such action. Because there is no indication that the Court abused its discretion, the 
rulings of the Court should be affirmed on appeal. 
E. Plaintiffs Argument That Dismissal Is Too Harsh A Sanction Is Baseless 
In Light Of His Own Actions of Willful Refusal To Cooperate In 
Discovery. 
Rule 37 provides that a party may be sanctioned by dismissal of its claim 
where it fails to cooperate in discovery. See. U.R.C.P. 37(2)(A)-(C). Plaintiff merely 
argues that dismissal is too harsh in light of his otherwise diligent efforts in 
prosecuting the action. 
Plaintiffs counsel argues that it would be a grave injustice to deprive his client 
of a trial for the failure of the mail system to inform him of the Order which caused 
him to miss the deadline by one business day. The Plaintiff portends to have gone to 
herculean efforts to prepare and prosecute this matter. However, when it came time 
to respond to discovery which Plaintiff represented he was prepared to offer at trial, 
his diligent pursuit seems to have come to an abrupt halt. The Court asked the 
following questions to which Plaintiff could not provide an answer: 
With all this at stake, why would counsel fail to answer the 
interrogatories or at least provide partial answers to opposing counsel 
when they were due? Why would counsel, knowing a motion to compel 
was filed, not respond to the Court in any way? Why would he not 
provide the answers he had? Why would he not seek an extension of 
time from the Court if he were having difficulty obtaining the 
information? Why, if he were ready to present at least part of the 
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information at trial on January 11, 1994 could he not produce it to 
counsel within the time limits of the rules. 
R. 480 (emphasis added); Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5. 
Plaintiffs appeal to this Court on the bare record cannot reflect the knowledge 
the District Court had, based on the representations of the parties and their conduct 
in the Court below. The Memorandum Decision reflects a careful synthesis of the 
Court's knowledge of the entirety of the events surrounding this case and should not 
be disturbed on appeal. Appendix 5. 
n. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT DUE TO FRAUD WHERE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
SHOW ANY FRAUD ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL. 
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court 
will be given broad discretion and on appeal its determination will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); 
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiff filed another Rule 60(b) Motion with the Court on June 9, 1994 
seeking relief from the judgment. R. 419. The Motion merely repeats the arguments 
made in the earlier Motion for Relief but adds specific arguments and allegations 
that Defendant's counsel committed fraud in obtaining the judgment. R. 405. 
The Court, in its Memorandum Decision, specifically ruled that Defendant's 
counsel's conduct did not constitute fraud. R. 479. The Court also noted that the 
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serious nature of the accusations absent any basis in fact was sufficient to merit 
personal sanctions against Plaintiffs counsel. R. 479. 
The factual premise of Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment based on 
fraud was unsupported by any reference to or basis in fact. As a result, the Court was 
well within its sound discretion in denying the Plaintiff relief from judgment due to 
fraud. 
III. 
THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE COURT WERE PROPER BASED 
ON PIAINTIFFS NUMEROUS BASELESS MOTIONS AND 
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AGAINST DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY. 
Plaintiff states that because the answers were timely and proper, Defendant 
should not have been entitled to sanctions or attorney's fees. The Plaintiff fails to set 
forth the reasoning of the Court in granting the attorney's fees below which clearly 
justifies their imposition. See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5. 
One of the several motions for relief asserted that Defendant's attorney 
affirmatively defrauded the Court in obtaining the Order compelling discovery and 
dismissal of the case. R. 419. After oral argument of the matter, the Court, in its 
Memorandum Decision, found none of the elements of fraud were present or shown 
and that Plaintiff had made serious allegations against Defendant's attorney without 
any factual basis. The Court stated: 
the representation(s) of the Defendant were not false and no fraud was 
committed. . . . Further, because of the serious nature of the accusation 
by Plaintiffs attorney and the fact that Plaintiffs failure to respond was 
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rather the result of a basic error on his part, the Court will order 
Plaintiffs attorney to personally pay the Defendant's attorney's fees in 
litigating this motion. 
R. 479; Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5. 
Even if this Court were to reverse the matter, the baseless allegation of fraud 
in and of itself merits the censure imposed by the District Court. Plaintiffs conduct 
in accusing counsel of fraud as a result of Plaintiffs own conduct is beneath the 
dignity which should be present in the legal forum. There should be no tolerance for 
allegations which directly impugn the character of a member of the bar that have no 
basis in fact. The Court's decision regarding sanctions was clearly not abused and 
must be affirmed on appeal. 
IV. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED P1JVINTIFFS CLAIMS FOR THE 
ALTERNATIVE REASON THAT THE RESPONSES PROVIDED TO 
DEFENDANT WERE NOT FULL AND COMPLETE ANSWERS TO THE 
DISCOVERY REQUEST AS ORDERED BY THE COURT. 
A party's failure to comply with an order for discovery may be met with the 
sanction of dismissal by the court. Tucker Realty Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah 
1964). A court's order dismissing a case for failure to comply with ordered discovery 
is reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989). 
In this case the entire trial was continued based on the representation by 
Plaintiff that he had new expert reconstruction evidence of Dr. Hoyt to present at 
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trial the following day. R. 484, 480. To learn what testimony and conclusions the 
expert held, Defendant immediately requested the opinions and conclusions of the 
expert be identified by answers to interrogatories. R. 160; R. 273 (affidavit of Terry 
M. Plant indicating the failure of Plaintiff to provide full and complete responses to 
the discovery requests). 
However, the April 25, 1994 answers which Plaintiff served on Defendant 
failed to provide any of the information sought in the requests, let alone "full and 
complete" answers as the Order compelling discovery required. Id. Plaintiffs 
responses merely indicated that the expert was going to be sent information on other 
witnesses and experts and that his conclusions and opinions were unknown to Plaintiff 
at the time. R. 256-58, Appendix 4. 
Therefore, even if the answers, by some stretch of the imagination, can be 
deemed timely, they were incomplete and did not satisfy the requirements of the 
April 12, 1994 Order compelling "full and complete answers" to the discovery 
requests. Dismissal of the case may be upheld for the alternative reason that Plaintiff 
failed to supply complete answers to the discovery requests as ordered by the Court 
even though he represented to the Court that he was ready to proceed to trial over 
three months before. 
The arguments in this area regarding Plaintiffs failure to provide complete 
answers to discovery illustrate that the Court was familiar with all of the procedural 
aspects of the case. The Court knew the positions of counsel prior to trial and what 
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the Plaintiff had represented regarding the testimony of the experts Plaintiff was 
going to call. The Court's decision to dismiss the case was based on its intimate 
knowledge of the case and conduct of counsel and should not be disturbed on appeal 
based on an emotional plea for mercy. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs prosecution of the appeal without reference to the entire body of 
evidence upon which the District Court based its ruling illustrates the duplicitous 
nature of Plaintiffs assertions below and on appeal. Based on a review of all of the 
relevant papers submitted by the parties, the District Court's Memorandum and 
Order can only be reasonably seen in one light; that the Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Plaintiffs Request for Relief from Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud, and Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal. To 
conclude otherwise would be to tolerate disregard of the rules of procedure and 
authority of the District Court to enforce its Orders. The judgment of the District 
Court dismissing Plaintiffs case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ S a y of fek 1995. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TERRY M. IQZANT 
BRADLEY R. HELSTEN 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing motion by mailing a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, this 
fesguAgy , 1995, to the following: 
DENVER C. SNUFFER, JR. 
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
William W. Morton 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 ) 
P. O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM W -10RTON, ] 
I ] 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL AND 
| AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
| Civil No. 910400454PI 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The mot io 1:1 • ::>£ th : defendant : • ?ompe 1 the plaintiff t :> 
j 
which were s e r v e d 01 1 t h e p l a i n t i f f < r abou t J a n u a r y *94 
h a v i n g been c o n s i d e r e d by t h e C o u r t , auu P l a i n t i f f hav ing i n e u no 
2 IJS(H iiiiie Inn i-nijii 11 ml i on o r r e s p o n s e s t o t h e a b o v e - r e f e r e n c e d 
d i s c o v e r y , 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff 
£ -1 0 1 lays I rem I he signing o • . Order, until 
! ; clock p.m. on the tenth day, to delivei: to Defendant full 
and complete responses LU tiie interrogator i es 
production of documents *« question (copies of which were attached 
t ;>• defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities Support 
suffer sanctions in accordance with Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which will be the dismissal of all of Plaintiff's 
claims for relief. Further, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
defendant be granted its attorney fees and other costs incurred in 
bringing its motion to compel. Said costs and attorney fees are to 
be supported by an appropriate affidavit or other proof. 
DATED this /*L, day of . 1994. 
HOgp^ABLE RAY M. HARD<1 
District Court Judge 
_CER^ fe&ICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND 
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES, postage prepaid, this l2-^  day of April, 
1994, to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
TMP:lrj/91-526.75 -2-
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC OR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE i JTAH 
WILLIAM W MORTON, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 910400454PI 
i Judge Ray M. Harding 
The Court, having considered the defendant's motion to 
dismiss for failure l:o comply with order compelling discovery and 
o r r u n I I I J I I tin in in ill ui I  I i ( l i t i,' in I . . . a 
previously ordered that the plaintiff would have i s 
from, the date of thi" order compelling discover' - " : •'- ^.m. 
on till: le t e i i t 1 1 day , I i la I ; , • . - - • 
r e s p o n s e s t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and request s t o : product ion of 
documents which were s u b j e c t : 3 u i u c i , emu having ordered 
* so comply w i t h f.lie o rder , t h e 
p l a i n t : i : w :u. . . , ! ; • - ; s a n c t i o n s i n accordance w i t h Rule 
t i i t uidu x\uxct> ui C i v i l Procedu,ii:eiir which wuiiiiJ ILm1 I h<» ui - -L 
of all of the plaintiff's claims for relief, having reviewed this 
matter, being fully advised in the premises, and finding good 
cause therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with order 
compelling discovery is granted. The Court finds that the 
plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's order dated April 
12, 1994. Based upon the plaintiff's failure to comply, and the 
sanctions indicated in the order, all of the plaintiff's claims 
in this action are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
in; i :i it : , j i in : "7<f i, A •" i : " i ' i i 
w a. :J J i, a, 11 i I \ 11: i i v t: I c u, \ i i i t» _
 jr,x • ' CI a. y v j i n, y i i J , 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
JL^ r/MA^L^t 
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FILED IK 
4r H DISTRICT COURT STAT;:
 : - ! ; - A H 
UT:,;' ; •••!::TY 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 1) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE Ob' UTAH 
WILLIAM W. MORTON, 
PlainHff, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF SIGNING 
OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910400454PI 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
COMES NOW 
accoL'dance. with Hu 58A(d) 
and hereby gives the plaintiff 
record, Denver C. Snuffei . . r> 
against the plaintiff dismissin • ~: ••:: '-
against the defendar 
order ni ilismiasa . tonorable Ray 
att.ai.'hixi Lo this notice of signing c: judgment. 
DATED this day of May, 1 993 
JON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
rocedure 
through its counsel of 
udgment * entered 
: , . ,„,, *.^„ r. h t? = 
dardinc 
TERI^  
Attorn^ for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Sui te 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2 97 0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Signing of Judgment, postage prepaid, this 
day of May, 1994, to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
C/^./.pi^ /f A^/uyj^ 
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4 T H 0 I S T R ! C T , C 0 U R T 
S T A T
" -~ L'TAH JfT H T V 
1013 M ^ 
Denver C. Snuffer, J r. 3 03 2 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 8 4 070 
Telephone: ("ni ) ^6-1400 
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM W MORTON, 
P.] aJ i iti f f, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
CT.RT1 T J - 'AIT . !•' I ELI VEKY 
Ci v i1 No 9104 00 4 54 P1 
Honorab1e Judge Harding 
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
I'l nnt iff'«" An W M , i<> u**\ eiukuit"" s Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents were facsmiled on Apr i 1 25, 2 994 and mai led 
postage prepaid with •: ittachmentf un Ma^ T 
Ildnt:, HANSON, hPP. . ^ d n~ • ,^ r -. %1 ^ ^ : 
Lake City, Utah . 
DATED this (ft day of 
4 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 3032 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 94070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM W. MORTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
i ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S 
i INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF 
I Civil No. 910400454PI 
I Honorable Judge Harding 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure hereby answers Defendant's Interrogatories to 
Plaintiff as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify each and every person 
known to the plaintiff or his representative who was at the 
accident scene in question on December 29, 1989, from an hour 
before the accident in question up to an including a week after the 
accident in question. This is meant to include all persons at the 
accident when it occurred, shortly thereafter, and all persons 
known by the plaintiff to have visited the accident scene during 
the 7 days after the accident. 
ANSWER: To the best of Plaintiff's knowledge these are 
the following individuals who were at the accident scene shortly 
thereafter and up to one week after the accident: William Morton, 
Stan Holyoak, Marvin Clark, Gayle Pike, Marvin Ainge, Shane Drage, 
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Gam Hooley, Ken Zupon and Tim Hobbs. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 2: For each person identified in 
response to Interrogatory No. 1, state the name, address, telephone 
number, social security number and employer of said person. 
ANSWER: 
Stan Holyoak: This information is already in the 
possession of the Defendant. 
Marvin Clark: This information is already in the 
possession of the Defendant. 
Gale Pike: Works for Savage Industries, can be contacted 
through them. His home address is 9949 Sego Lilly, Sandy, Utah. 
Marvin Ainge: Works for Savage Industries. Plaintiff 
has learned that he has just moved to Payson, Utah. 
Shane Drage: Worked for Savage Industries but is now an 
independent trucker working out of Idaho. We do not have a current 
address. 
Gam Hooley: Works for Savage Industries. We have no 
address or phone number. 
Ken Zupon: Works for Associated Foods. We have no 
address or phone number. 
Tim Hobbs: Works for Associated Foods. We have no 
address or phone number. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 3: For each person identified in 
response to Interrogatory No. 1, provide a detailed statement of 
the reason why said person was at the accident scene, the events 
observed or information gained by said person at the accident 
scene, and any testimony the plaintiff anticipates eliciting from 
said witness as part of the evidence to be produced at trial in 
this matter. 
ANSWER; 
Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory because it is 
asking the Plaintiff to speak for witnesses that are not affiliated 
with nor controlled by the Plaintiff. The only information that 
the Plaintiff has in his possession is the best understanding that 
Plaintiff has of what these witnesses know. Therefore, Plaintiff 
cannot answer the question as propounded. However, without waiving 
such objection, Plaintiff answers as follows: 
Stan Holyoak was a mechanic for Johnson Oil and was sent 
to inspect the damage to the tractor and to salvage parts from the 
tractor after the accident which were not insured. He also went to 
the accident scene sometime within the first week and inspected the 
scene. While we cannot speak for the witness, we anticipate that 
the witness will testify that he inspected the truck after the 
accident and saw that its transmisson had split, that the impact to 
the transmission was such that the main gear fell out the bottom of 
the broken transmission housing and that the entire transmission 
grease would have been immediately lost from the size of the crack. 
He will testify to the oil weight and volume in the transmission. 
He also has driven the same trailer-pup rig that was being driven 
by Woody Morton on the day of the accident. He worked on the 
trailer-pup vehicles and maintained them. When the brakes on these 
rigs are engaged the pup would engage its brakes first and the 
trailer would engage second and later. When the pup is empty, 
although it is a dual wheeled vehicle, it has a camber to its axle 
and rides on its outside tires. When the pup is loaded with fuel, 
it rides on all of its tires. He has skidded the trailer-pup 
before when driving with them, and has seen the kind of mark that 
the vehicles leave on the roadway. He visited the scene of the 
accident and recognized skid marks that were left by the pup at the 
scene which can now be seen in several photographs of the scene. 
Marvin Clark was the safety inspector for Johnson Oil and 
inspected the tractor as well as the scene of the accident. He 
took several photographs at the scene and will identify them. They 
show that highway department spread dirt into the lane of travel 
belonging to the Woody Morton vehicle after the accident to cover 
fluid spills, but there were no efforts to place dirt into the 
other lane of travel because of the absence of any significant 
fluid spills. 
Gayle Pike is a driver for Savage Industries and was 
there prior to the arrival of police and medical personnel. He 
walked the accident scene prior to the arrival of the police and 
he, Marvin Ainge and Shane Drage were the drivers who spoke with 
Officer Pelton. Both he and the others can testify about 
statements made by Trooper Pelton prior to beginning his 
investigation to the effect that Woody Morton was responsible for 
causing the accident. Gayle Pike can testify as to the layout of 
the accident scene. He saw the paramedics remove Woody Morton from 
the vehicle and helped in that process. Since Gayle is not a 
party to the suit but a witness the Plaintiff does not control his 
testimony. To the extent that Plaintiff has any recorded statement 
from the witness, it is being provided with these answers. 
Marvin Ainge: Marvin Ainge is a driver for Savage 
Industries and was the first driver who stopped at the scene of the 
accident. Mr. Ainge was traveling East. Mr. Ainge was there prior 
to the police and he also walked the accident scene. He can offer 
information as to the accident scene and the condition of Mr. 
Morton. Since Mr. Ainge is not a party to the suit but a witness 
the Plaintiff does not control his testimony. To the extent that 
Plaintiff has any recorded statement of Mr. Ainge, it is being 
produced. Mr. Ainge was the first vehicle stopped in the direction 
from which Mr. Morton was traveling and there were no other 
vehicles between his vehicle and the accident itself. He does not 
believe that the skid marks in Woody Morton's Ian* of travel were 
left by his vehicle. His truck-trailer-pup rig had an overall 
length of 92'3" and had eleven axles: the driving axle with two 
tires, followed by two driver axles with four tires each on the 
tractor, three axles with single tires on each on the rear of the 
trailer, two axles with super-single tires on each on the front of 
the pup-trailer and three axles with single tires on each on the 
rear of the pup. He is acquainted with the kind of skid mark left 
by the rig he was operating and the skid mark in Mr. Morton's lane 
of travel near the accident is not the type that his rig would 
leave on any of the three components to his vehicle. He can also 
recall talking with Trooper Pelton about the tracks left by a 
passing vehicle that had gone through the accident scene before 
anyone else arrived. That vehicle had tracked fuel and grease away 
from the accident scene leaving tracks that went from Woody 
Morton's lane of travel into the Wonder Bread truck's lane of 
travel. Trooper Pelton said these were Mskid,f marks left by Woody 
Morton's truck and that they showed how Mr. Morton had traveled on 
the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident. Mr. Ainge 
argued with him saying that the marks were clearly diesel fuel 
tracks and not skid marks. Trooper Pelton also said that the truck 
of Mr. Morton had spun either 180 or 360 (he can't recall which) on 
the road after the accident, which Mr. Ainge also thought was not 
correct. 
Shane Drage: At the time of the accident he worked for 
Savage Industries. He was one of the drivers who stopped at the 
scene of the accident. He walked the scene of the accident and was 
also the one who had discussion with Pelton upon his arrival. He 
can testify about statements made by Trooper Pelton prior to 
beginning his investigation to the effect that Trooper Pelton knew 
who was responsible for the accident without looking the scene over 
and that it was Mr. Morton's fault. Shane Drage has information as 
to the layout of the accident scene and the condition of William 
Morton. Since Mr. Drage is not a party to the suit the Plaintiff 
does not control his testimony. 
Gam Hooley: Works for Savage Industries and was one of 
the drivers who stopped at the accident scene. He walked the scene 
of the accident. It is not determined at this time of any 
testimony will be elicited from Gam Hooley. If in the future 
Plaintiff intends to use Garn Hooley any testimony he may offer 
will be disclosed to the Defendant. 
Ken Zupon: Works for Associated Foods. He was also 
another driver who stopped at the scene of the accident. Plaintiff 
has not determined at this time if any testimony will be elicited 
from Ken Zupon. If Mr. Zupon can add any facts other than those 
already disclosed by other witnesses, that testimony will be 
provided to the Defendant. 
Tim Hobbs: Was the first driver through the accident 
scene. Tim Hobbs did not stop but proceeded on and called the 
accident in at the cement plant. It is not anticipated that any 
testimony will be elicited from Tim Hobbs. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: For each person identified in 
response to Interrogatory No. 1, state the time when Plaintiff or 
his agents became aware that said person was at the accident site 
in question, the method by which the plaintiff became aware of said 
person's presence at the accident site in question and the method 
by which the plaintiff learned of information known by each person 
who was at the accident site. 
ANSWER: These individuals have become gradually known 
to Plaintiff and some have not yet been interviewed. Most of the 
savage drivers became aware to the Plaintiff by word of mouth. The 
first driver that Plaintiff became aware of was Shane Drage, the 
exact date of this conversation is not known but is believed to be 
sometime in mid-1993. Upon talking to Shane Drage he identified 
many of the other drivers who had stopped. The two drivers of 
Associated Food were disclosed through contact with associated food 
through their personnel director. Plaintiff believes her name was 
Nancy. Mr. Ainge was interviewed in April 1994 for the first time. 
Mr. Pike was interviewed just prior to the last date this matter 
was set for trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5; Identify all employees or 
representative of Savage Trucking Company who the plaintiff was 
aware were at the accident scene in questions for the time period 
specified in Interrogatory No.l. If not provided above, state all 
information concerning the representatives and employees of Savage 
Trucking Company sought as to other persons in Interrogatories 2, 
3 and 4 above. 
ANSWER; See answer to Interrogatory number 2 above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify the dispatcher of 
Savaga Trucking Company who was on duty at the time of the accident 
in question. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff does not know at present. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all persons known to 
the plaintiff or his representatives known to have heard police 
officers or other representatives of th$ state of Utah involved in 
the investigation of the accident ix\ question make comments 
concerning the investigation and specifically comments suggesting 
that p^olice officers were or may hav^ been biased against the 
interest of the plaintiff and/or biased in favor of the deceased 
agent of the deferidant, LeGrand Wilson. 
ANSWER; At present Plaintiff is only aware of three of 
the dirivers who heard those remarks and they are identified above 
in th§ prior answer to No. 2, above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8; Plea.se state whether the 
plaintiff anticipates that the previously identified expert, Don 
Remington, will testify differently or in areas other than those 
specifically identified in his deposition previously taken in this 
case. If additional and/or different testimony is anticipated 
which is in any way inconsistent with, supportive of, or addresses 
new areas of subject matter not fully and completely addressed in 
his deposition, state the following: 
(a) the new subject matter upon which Don Remington will or 
may testify at trial; 
(b) the general substance of any new testimony or new areas 
which the expert will provide at trial, including opinions held by 
Mr. Remington concerning the issues in this action; 
(c) educational background, employment experience, or 
individual experience as an expert witness which the plaintiff 
believes qualifies Mr. Remington to provide such testimony; and 
(d) documents or other factual material (i.e., photographs, 
videotapes, etc.) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony 
or testify in new areas. 
ANSWER: This answer requires direct information from the 
expert as to what his testimony will be. We will supplement this 
answer when Mr. Remington provides us an answer. He is being 
provided with these answers to Interrogatories and also with the 
accompanying production of documents and asked to provide an answer 
to this interrogatory. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please state whether the 
plaintiff anticipates that the previously identified expert, Dr. 
Phillip Hoyt, will testify differently or in area other than those 
specifically identified in his deposition previously taken in this 
case. If additional and/or different testimony is anticipated 
which is in any way inconsistent with, supportive of, or addresses 
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new ares of subject matter not fully and completely addressed on 
his deposition, state the following: 
(a) the new subject matter upon which Phil Hoyt will or may 
testify at trial; 
(b) the general substance of any new testimony or new areas 
which the expert will provide at trial, including opinions held by 
Mr. Hoyt concerning the issues in this action; 
(c) educational background, employment experience, or 
individual experience as an expert witness which the plaintiff 
believes qualifies Mr. Hoyt to provide such testimony; and 
(d) documents or other factual material (i.e., photographs, 
videotapes, etc.) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony 
or testify in new areas. 
ANSWER: Just as Don Remington is being provided these 
answers and asked to respond to the preceding question, Dr. Hoyt 
will also be given these answers and asked to answer this question. 
When the answer is received, it will be forwarded to you. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please state whether the plaintiff 
anticipates calling Mr. Greg Duval at the trial in this matter, 
either as a witness in their case in chief or as a rebuttal 
witness. If the answer to said interrogatory is yes, state in 
detail: 
(a) the subject matter upon which Mr. Greg Duval will or may 
testify at trial; 
(b) the general substance of his testimony which he will or 
may provide at trial, including opinions held by Mr. Greg Duval 
concerning the issues in this action; 
(c) the educational background, employment experience, and 
the individuals experience as an expert witness, including each 
and every trail at which he has testified as an expert witness in 
the last 10 years, if any, and/or any other relevant information 
which the plaintiff contends qualifies Mr. Duval to provide expert 
witness testimony; and 
(d) documents or other factual material (i.e., photographs, 
videotapes, etc.) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony 
or testify in new areas. 
ANSWER: Yes, it is anticipated that he will be called 
as a rebuttal witness. As to the other matters, Mr. Duval is being 
provided with these answers and asked to review them and provide an 
answer to this interrogatory in light of the information provided. 
The witness' resume is being provided. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please state the name of each 
and every additional expert witness not previously identified in 
your answers to these interrogatories whom the plaintiff 
anticipates calling at trial. This is meant to include all expert 
witnesses who will testify in any regard, including damages, 
liability or other issues involved in this matter. 
ANSWER: Other than the experts already disclosed, 
including Paul Randall, and the two treating physicians, Plaintiff 
at present does not intend on calling any new experts. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: For each expert identified, 
identify: 
(a) the subject matter upon which each expert will or may 
testify at trial; 
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(b) the general substance of the testimony which each will or 
may provide at trial, including opinions held by each expert 
concerning the issues in this action; 
(c) the educational background, the employment experience, 
and the individuals experience as an expert witness, including 
each and every trial at which the individual has testified as an 
expert witness in the last ten (10) years, if any; and 
(d) document or other factual material (i.e., photographs, 
videotapes, etc,) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony 
or testify in new areas. 
ANSWER: Not Applicable, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Of the expert witnesses 
identified, please state whether or not any of the witnesses so 
identified has visited the scene of the accident. If said witness 
has not yet visited the scene of the accident, please state whether 
the plaintiff anticipates having said witness visit the scene of 
the accident between now and the time of the trial in this matter. 
ANSWER: The only experts which Plaintiff has disclosed 
that has not been to the scene of the accident is Dr. Philip Hoyt, 
the economist and the treating doctors. It is anticipated that Dr. 
Hoyt will at some point visit the scene of the accident. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: If an expert witness identified 
in the preceding interrogatory had visited the scene of the 
accident in question, please state in detail the following: 
(a) all measurements, testing or other investigative 
activities performed by the expert at the scene; 
(b) the results of any testing or measurement, including a 
statement of all items tested and/or measured; 
(c) the date or dates of any and all visits to the accident 
scene were made. 
ANSWER; These have been previously provided except for the 
future visit of Dr. Hoyt. This future material cannot, of course, 
be produced in these answers. 
DATED this j \ day of April, 1994. 
William Morton 
FER & DAHLE 
Cv"SNUFFER 
r6rney for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 3032 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM W. MORTON, ; 
Plaintiff, 
v s . ] 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
I PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCTION 
l OF DOCUMENTS 
I Civil No. 910400454PI 
1 Honorable Judge Harding 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure hereby produces the following documents as follows: 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
1. Copies of all plaintiff's drivers' logs and/or ICC 
logs of any kind for the period of 11/29/89-12/29/89, including but 
not limited to the logs referred to by the plaintiff in his 
deposition taken March 3, 1992 on pages 23 and 24. 
ANSWER: These documents do not exist any longer. 
2. A complete copy of each and every document, 
including photographs and/or other resource materials of any kind 
relied upon by each of the plaintiff's experts identified in answer 
to the interrogatories accompanying these requests. It is 
anticipated that for each expert identified, the plaintiff will 
produce to the defendant a complete and separate file of documents 
relied upon. 
ANSWER: These have already been provided to you for Don 
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Remington. As to the other witnesses, they have now reviewed all 
the State Highway photographs and video tape which is already in 
your possession. They have also reviewed the photos taken of scene 
thereafter by the Johnson Oil employee. Although you have these 
photos, a photocopy of these are being produced with these answers. 
3. A complete of all notes, calculations and/or 
writings of any kind created by any of the expert witnesses 
identified by the plaintiff in answers to the interrogatories 
accompanying these requests, which were created by, relied upon or 
which pertain to any of the opinions reached by said experts. It 
is anticipated that the plaintiff will produce a separate file for 
each expert identified containing all notes, calculations or other 
writings of any kind prepared by said expert. 
ANSWER: These have already been produced as to Dr. Hoyt 
and Don Remington. As to Greg Duval, they will be provided to the 
extent that they exist. 
4. To the extent not previously produced in responses 
to requests number 2 and 3, copies of all file materials in 
possessions of the plaintiff's experts, including but not limited 
to resource material, research, material, and specifically all 
documents comprising the various files utilized by, relied upon, 
created by, or otherwise assisting the plaintiff's expert in 
reaching opinions in this matter. 
ANSWER: This request is overly broad and inappropriately 
seeks to have produced work product that the Plaintiff has had to 
pay to obtain. The Defendant should not receive this information 
without compensating the Plaintiff for it. 
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5. Copies of all statements, affidavits and/or other 
records of testimony obtained by the plaintiff of any witness, 
including but not limited to all witnesses, both expert and lay, 
identified by the plaintiff in response to the accompanying 
interrogatories. 
ANSWER: See accompanying documents. 
6. All documents referred to or otherwise identified in 
your answers to the interrogatories accompanying these requests. 
ANSWER: See accompanying documents. 
7. Copies of all pictures, photogramic studies or other 
material in the possession of plaintiff, his representatives or 
plaintiff's experts, which have been utilized by the plaintiff's 
experts in arriving at their opinions in this matter. 
ANSWER: These have already been produced. 
8. Copies of all exhibits not previously identified or 
produced which plaintiff anticipates offering at the trial herein. 
ANSWER: These have been produced except for certain 
medical x-rays and implant devices that are available for 
inspection at counsels office. 
DATED this J* J" day of April, 1994. 
/ci^w^v. 
William Morton 
ON^SjNDFFER fi^ DAHLE 
/ 
^C/SNUFFER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10885 -'south State street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
5 
Fourth Judioial District Court of 
Utafc County, State of Utah. 
CARMM SMITH Clerk 
_ 0»puty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MORTON, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BAKING CO., 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 910400454 
DATE: August 29, 1994 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERKS: Joe Morton, Laura 
Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling on a number of motions and objections 
filed in this case since the filing of the Defendant's Motion to Compel on March 18, 1994. 
Having received and considered the various motions and objections together with memoranda 
both in support and in opposition to such, having reviewed the file and having heard the 
argument of counsel on July 5, 1994, the Court makes the following findings: 
1) This case was originally filed on July 15, 1991. It has been set for trial four 
times and has involved a significant amount of legal maneuvering. The last continuance was 
requested the day before trial was to begin because the Plaintiff purportedly had new 
evidence and theories to be given by expert witnesses at trial. Defendant's counsel argued 
that it would be unfair to proceed without an opportunity to discover the new evidence and 
become adequately prepared. Rather than exclude the evidence, the Court reset the trial in 
order to give the Defendant time for discovery. 
2) Pursuant to this allowance for additional discovery, Defendant served 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Plaintiff on or about January 
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14, 1994, three days after the third trial setting was to have begun. 
3) Plaintiff did not respond to the Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents, and on March 18, 1994, the Defendant filed a Motion to Compel 
and a Memorandum in Support of Points and Authorities of Defendant's Motion to Compel 
along with an order for the Court's signature. 
4) In an affidavit filed May 11, 1994, Plaintiffs attorney admitted that he had 
received the Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents as well as the Motion 
to Compel. 
5) Plaintiff failed to respond to the Motion to Compel and on March 31, 1994, the 
Defendant filed a Notice to Submit for decision. 
6) The Court reviewed the documents on April 12, 1994 and gave instruction that 
Defendant's counsel prepare an order giving the Plaintiff 10 days from the date of the 
signing of the order to fully and completely answer the interrogatories or face dismissal of 
the case. This order was prepared in accordance with the Court's instructions and was 
signed the same day. This signed order gave the Plaintiff until 5:00 p.m. on April 22, 1994 
to complete the answers. A copy of the order was mailed to the Plaintiff. 
7) The Defendant did not receive the answers by the deadline on the 22nd. On April 
25, 1994, Defendant prepared a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Order 
Compelling Discovery. A copy of this motion, its memorandum in support, and an affidavit 
of Defendant's attorney Terry M. Plant, were hand delivered to the Plaintiff. An Order of 
Dismissal was also submitted to the Court and a copy hand delivered to the Plaintiff. 
8) Upon reviewing the affidavit of counsel on April 28, 1994, the Court signed the 
Order of Dismissal. 
9) On May 6th the Plaintiff sent to the Court a Certificate of Delivery certifying that 
he had faxed answers to the interrogatories to the Defendant on April 25, 1994, and had 
mailed them on May 6, 1994. 
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10) On May 11, 1994, Defendant filed a Notice of Signing of Judgment, a copy of 
which was sent to the Plaintiff on May 6th. Plaintiff acknowledges receiving this document 
on May 9, 1994. 
11) On May 11, 1994, Plaintiff began his response to the actions of the past month 
and a half by filing his Motion for Relief From Judgment and supporting memorandum. On 
May 20, 1994, Defendant filed his Memorandum in Opposition and on May 26th Plaintiff 
replied. Finding no reason to grant the motion, the Court denied it on May 26, 1994. 
Despite the fact that the Plaintiff did not timely request oral argument, on June 16, 1994, the 
Court vacated its earlier Memorandum Decision in order to grant Plaintiff the opportunity for 
oral argument on July 5, 1994. This motion will be addressed in this Memorandum 
Decision. The Court has also received objections from both sides as to the form of the 
other's submitted order. Since the Memorandum Decision has been vacated the Court will 
not address either objection. 
12) On June 9, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud 
and to Extend Time for Appeal and its memorandum in support. On June 14, 1994, the 
Court signed an order extending the time of appeal. On June 17, 1994, Defendant filed his 
Memorandum in Opposition and on June 20th Plaintiff replied. This motion will be 
addressed in this Memorandum Decision. 
13) On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal dated 
April 28, 1994 and its memorandum in support. On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed his 
Memorandum in Opposition. This motion will be addressed in this Memorandum Decision. 
14) On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike Order dated April 12, 
1994 and its memorandum in support. On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed his Memorandum 
in Opposition. This motion will be addressed in this Memorandum Decision. 
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I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT DATED MAY 11, 1994. 
In this motion the Plaintiff makes four arguments: 1) that the interrogatories were 
answered on time, 2) that he was unaware that an order to compel had been signed or that a 
request for judgement had been submitted, 3) that any failure on the part of the Plaintiff was 
the product of mistake, inadvertence or neglect on the part of his attorney which should be 
excused, and 4) that the Defendant failed to comply with the service requirements of Rule 
4-501, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Plaintiffs first argument is simply incorrect. Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
covers the computation of time. "[T]he day of the act [April 12] . . . shall not be included." 
Thus, the 13th is the first day, the 14th the second and so on until the 22nd, which is the 
10th day. The time for answering the interrogatories expired at 5:00 p.m. on April 22, 
1994. Plaintiff admits the answers were received by the Defendant at the earliest on April 
25, 1994. In short, the interrogatories were not answered in time. 
Plaintiff next argues that he knew nothing of the Court's proceedings from the time 
the Defendant filed his Motion to Compel on March 18, 1994, until May 9, 1994, when he 
received the Notice of Signing of Judgment. During oral argument, counsel explained that 
he has been having some problem with the mail. The Court's records indicate that six 
documents were either mailed or hand delivered to the Plaintiff during that time. The Court 
is not convinced by Plaintiffs assertions and finds that the Plaintiff, through his attorney or 
his attorney's staff, knew of the order compelling the answers to the interrogatories and 
failed to answer them in the allotted time. 
Plaintiff next argues that to the extent the Plaintiff has failed to respond timely, 
Plaintiffs counsel has done so mistakenly, inadvertently, or through neglect which should be 
excused by the Court. Plaintiffs counsel appeals to the Court's sense of logic. He points 
out that the case has been ready to go to trial on two prior occasions and that the Plaintiff 
and his counsel "have invested years of time and considerable out of pocket costs in 
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advancing this case." Plaintiffs counsel argues that he must have been unaware of the 
deadline because if he had known of the deadline he would have complied with it. 
This Court has similar questions. With all this at stake, why would counsel fail to 
answer the interrogatories or at least provide partial answers to opposing counsel when they 
were due? Why would counsel, knowing that a motion to compel was filed, not respond to 
the Court in any way? Why would he not then provide the answers he had? Why would he 
not seek an extension of time from the Court if he were having difficulty obtaining the 
information? Why, if he were ready to present at least part of the information at trial on 
January 11, 1994, could he not produce it to counsel within the time limits of the rules? 
The Court does not know the answer to any of these questions; however, it does 
know that it has not been offered any satisfactory explanation by Plaintiffs counsel. Any 
mistakes, inadvertence and neglect which may have occurred at the office of Plaintiffs 
counsel are not an excuse for the manner in which Plaintiffs counsel has handled this matter. 
Plaintiff finally argues that the Defendant failed to comply with the service 
requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration and claims that none of 
the documents requesting judgment, i.e. the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply With 
Discovery, the supporting memorandum with exhibits, and the Order of Dismissal, were ever 
received by the Plaintiff. The Court notes that each has the required Certificate of Service 
attached and the further affidavit of John Braithwaite attesting that he personally delivered 
the documents to the office of Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to refute 
or call into question whether the documents were actually hand delivered as claimed. As 
such, the Court will take the Certificates of Service at face value and find that the documents 
in question were delivered to Plaintiffs counsel. 
Not being persuaded by any of the arguments advanced by the Plaintiff, the Court 
will deny the Plaintiffs motion. 
5 
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGEMENT DUE TO FRAUD AND TO 
EXTEND TIME FOR APPEAL DATED JUNE 9, 1994. 
In this motion, Plaintiff argues that he failed to respond to discovery requests due to 
fraud and misrepresentations to the Court by Defendant. The representations of the 
Defendant were not false and no fraud was committed or attempted. As such, the motion is 
denied. Further, because of the serious nature of the accusation by Plaintiffs attorney and 
the fact that Plaintiffs failure to respond was rather the result of a basic error on his part, 
the Court will order Plaintiffs attorney to personally pay the Defendant's attorney fees in 
litigating this motion. 
HI. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER OF DISMISSAL DATED APRIL 28, 
1994 DATED JUNE 20, 1994. 
Plaintiff argues that the Order of Dismissal was signed prematurely because the Court 
should have given the Plaintiff 10 days in which to respond, in accordance with CJA Rule 4-
501, before it ruled on the motion. 
While technically titled a motion, the purpose of the Defendant's documents was to 
inform the Court that Plaintiff had failed to comply with the Court's earlier order and to ask 
the Court to implement the sanctions prescribed in that order. The order signed on April 28, 
1994, merely executes the sanctions of the earlier order. 
Plaintiffs failure to file any response to the motion eliminates any standing the 
Plaintiff has to claim that the memorandum was not considered. Moreover, in subsequent 
affidavits the Plaintiff admits that its answers to interrogatories were not submitted by the 
deadline imposed by the original order. Judicial economy and fairness are not furthered by 
allowing the Plaintiff to argue a point that it has not preserved and that it admits it did not 
comply with. 
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WHEREFORE, 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 29th day of August, 1994. 
cc: Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq. 
Terry M. Plant, Esq. 
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM W. MORTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
)JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
)TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT DUE TO 
)FRAUD AND TO EXTEND TIME FOR 
APPEAL AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS 
)TO STRIKE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL 
) 
) Civil No. 910400454PI 
) Judge Ray M. Harding 
The following motions of the Plaintiff came before the 
Court for oral argument on July 5, 1994: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment dated 
May 11, 1994; 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud 
and to Extend Time for Appeal dated June 9, 1994; 
3. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Order Dated April 12, 
1994 dated June 20, 1994; and 
4. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal Dated 
April 28, 1994 dated June 9, 1994. 
The Plaintiff having been represented by Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and 
the Defendant having been represented by Terry M. Plant, the Court 
having reviewed all memoranda and objections filed by the various 
counsel concerning each of the motions, as well as oral argument of 
counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court makes the 
following findings: 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
1. This matter was originally filed on July 15, 1991. 
The case has been continued four times. The last continuance was 
requested the day before trial was to begin because the Plaintiff 
purportedly had new evidence and theories to be given by expert 
witnesses at trial. Defendant's counsel argued that it would be 
unfair to proceed without an opportunity to discover the new 
evidence and adequately prepare himself. Rather than exclude 
evidence, the Court reset the trial to give the Defendant time for 
discovery. 
2. Pursuant to the allowance for additional discovery, 
Defendant served interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents on or about January 14, 1994, three days after the third 
trial setting was to have begun. 
3. Due to Plaintiff's failure to respond to the 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, on 
March 18, 1994 the Defendant filed a motion to compel, together 
with a memorandum of points and authorities in support of its 
motion to compel. 
4. In accordance with the affidavit of May 11, 1994 of 
Plaintiff's counsel, he admitted that he received the 
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interrogatories and requests for production of documents, as well 
as the motion to compel. 
5. Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion to compel 
and on March 31, 1994, the Defendant filed a notice to submit for 
decision. 
6. The Court reviewed the documents on April 12, 1994 
and gave instruction that Defendant's counsel prepare an order 
giving the Plaintiff 10 days from the date of the signing of the 
order to fully and completely answer the interrogatories or face 
dismissal of the case. This order was prepared in accordance with 
the Court's instructions and was signed the same day. This signed 
order gave the Plaintiff until 5:00 p.m. on April 22, 1994 to 
complete the answers. A copy of the order was mailed to the 
Plaintiff. 
7. The Defendant did not receive the answers by the 
deadline on the 22nd. On April 25, 1994, Defendant prepared a 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Order Compelling 
Discovery. A copy of this motion, its memorandum in support, and 
an affidavit of Defendant's attorney Terry M. Plant were delivered 
to the Plaintiff. An Order of Dismissal was also submitted to the 
Court and a copy delivered to the Plaintiff. 
8. Upon reviewing the affidavit of counsel on April 28, 
1994, the Court signed the Order of Dismissal. 
9. On May 6, the Plaintiff sent to the Court a 
Certificate of Delivery certifying that he had faxed answers to the 
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interrogatories to the Defendant on April 25, 1994, and had mailed 
them on May 6, 1994. 
10. On May 11, 1994, Defendant filed a Notice of Signing 
of Judgment, a copy of which was sent to the Plaintiff on May 6 by 
the Defendant. Plaintiff acknowledges receiving this document on 
May 9, 1994. 
11. On May 11, 1994, Plaintiff began his response to the 
actions of the past month and a half by filing his Motion for 
Relief from Judgment and supporting memorandum. On May 20, 1994, 
Defendant filed his Memorandum in Opposition and on May 26, 1994, 
Plaintiff replied. Finding no reason to grant the motion, the 
Court denied it on May 26, 1994. Despite the fact that the 
Plaintiff did not timely request oral argument, on June 16, 1994, 
the Court vacated its earlier Memorandum Decision in order to grant 
Plaintiff the opportunity for oral argument on July 5, 1994. 
Because the Court vacated its Memorandum Decision of May 26, 1994, 
the objections to that order filed by both sides need not be 
considered. 
12. On June 9, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment Due to Fraud and to Extend Time for Appeal and his 
memorandum in support. 
13. On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike 
Order of Dismissal dated April 28, 1994 and his memorandum in 
support, and a Motion to Strike Order Dated April 12, 1994 and his 
memorandum in support. 
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ORDER OF THE COURT 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment dated 
May 11, 1994 is hereby denied. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud 
and to Extend Time for Appeal dated June 9, 1994 is hereby denied 
and further, for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision 
of the Court dated August 29, 1994, Plaintiff's attorney is to 
personally pay Defendant's attorney's fees in litigating this 
motion in the agreed-upon amount of $250.00. 
3. Plaintiff's Motions to Strike Orders of Dismissal 
Dated April 12, 1994 and April 28, 1994 are hereby denied. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of September, 1994. 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT DUE TO FRAUD AND TO EXTEND TIME FOR APPEAL AND PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTIONS TO STRIKE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL, this JX^ day of September, 
1994, to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
91-526. -6-
